MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE   May 21, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Additional Insights Obtained from the
                      Three Crisis Studies

INTRODUCTION

The three crisis studies are now finished and a limited set of recom-
mendations agreed to by the NSCIC Working Group have been forwarded
to the NSCIC principals. The purpose of this memo is to put on the
record some additional insights and recommendations that the studies
and/or the process of doing the studies suggested. Thus what follows
gives:

> -- Additional background information on the development
> of some of the recommendations of the Working Group.
> The DCI and others may find this useful in responding to
> the recommendations.

> -- Important problems and ideas surfaced by the studies,
> or during the study process, that suggest additional areas
> in which corrective action is needed.

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE DCI

1. The Working Group recommendations suggest the need for separate
individuals to be responsible for identifying consumer needs, running
task forces, preparing estimative products, and monitoring the entire
effort. While it is left to the DCI to decide whether all of these jobs
need to be individually manned, our view is that combining these tasks
and using fewer people creates a work overload in most crises. Clear
assignment of responsibility is also better obtained by separating these
assignments.

NSC review completed.

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2. The liaison representative should not be an analyst. While he should be familiar with the geographical area in which the crisis is occurring, there is a real question as to the value of having him supported by area experts. The inclination to start providing analysis to consumers (rather than guidance to producers) could become too great. It is especially important that this man focus almost all his attention on finding out what the consumers really want and on preparing perceptive, specific and detailed terms of reference for the products that the intelligence community is to produce. In particular it should be his role to make sure that more estimative and in-depth analyses are produced. It should be a primary responsibility of his to see that in future crises the balance between status reporting and analytic and estimative pieces is different than it has been in the past ones. As pointed out in the three studies, the flow of analytic pieces usually is reduced to a mere trickle after the crisis starts. Partly this is the result of the way in which task forces are manned during crises, but it is presumedly also caused by the lack of clear-cut demand for these products. In retrospect the top level staffs say that they want them, and it should be the liaison man's job to make sure there is a richer stream of this sort of product in the future. Moreover, it is his responsibility to see that they are targeted on the issues that people are really concerned about.

3. The individual with overall responsibility for management of the intelligence support process should be a manager, not an analyst. Also he should understand that he has control over both guidance and product. He will be expected to interpret and assign the former in concurrence with the liaison representative and he will monitor the latter. One of the problems, of course, of the intelligence community is that its career process does not generate people who are first class managers. A further stage of the fixup process will involve changing the training programs and the selection programs in the personnel system. In any case the individual we have in mind should be primarily selected for his management capabilities, that is to see that the whole support process functions well, that resources get assigned and that the requirements are met.

4. Skilled area experts are a scarce commodity. The DCI may want to consider not only keeping them from the staffing of the liaison representative and his group, but even off the task forces. Especially so since the task forces tend to merely do status reporting. These experts are going to be called upon for some complex analyses for

which they are little prepared. The kinds of products that are needed are not those that they regularly produce now. Their energy should be preserved, not diffused in a number of directions. If there is going to be a first rate response to the demand for more analytic and estimative products, the area experts ought to be primarily conserved for this production.

5. Perhaps the community can produce a joint current reporting product with the focus and timeliness required. The liaison representative could ensure the correct focus. Timeliness depends on the agencies being able to resolve differences over who is to cover what topic, preferences for writing styles, and commitment to positions. But differences be-tween the agencies may be too complicated to be resolved, in which case the DCI could simply direct the agencies to submit independent reports by a certain time and covering a certain period. In the Working Group report we have recommended that an attempt be made to produce a community wide product periodically during the crisis. The production of several independent reports is a fall-back position which we originally included in the draft of the Working Group report. It was removed at the insistence of some of the participants. But NSC staff people and we have some doubts whether the community will in fact be able to produce the report as specified. Therefore we would be satisfied with the fall-back position. The DCI should be aware of this background to the Working Group recommendations.

6. The mechanics of improving communication between all of the parties involved in a crisis, that is, the producing organizations, the top level staffs, the various watch centers, task force, etc., was passed over in the Working Group report. There exist real differences of opinion as how best to improve the mechanics of that communication. Some people favor fairly elaborate ADP solutions, others believe that simply having more green phones down at the NSC staff and other minor fixes could significantly improve the situation. The DCI should have a broad gauge study of this whole problem before committing himself in this area.

PROBLEMS NOT COVERED IN THE WORKING GROUP REPORT

During the course of the three studies, a number of issues arose and were discussed, covered in the studies, but not included for a variety of reasons in the final set of recommendations. A partial list follows:

1. The process of supervising the studies has convinced me that the
intelligence community has a marginal capability to review its products
or its performance. Every study had its incidents of the teams (A) being
unable to perceive problems, (B) being unwilling or unable to conduct
objective critiques of intelligence inputs, and (C) being unwilling to engage
in a rigorous effort to document conclusions or to understand and present
a full picture of the events which occurred during a crisis. When good
work was done in a study, it was the result of single individual efforts such
as those of [   ]; by and large other team
members and leaders seemed unable to produce. My opinion of the quality
of the final study products is mixed, but I attribute much of their substantive
contribution to the efforts of my staff to keep them focused on important
issues, to conduct critical reviews of initial drafts, and to carry out
independent research on key issues.

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2. Two of the studies suggest to me that improvements could be made in
intelligence contingency planning for crises. There do not seem to be
any systematic mechanisms for serious contingency planning within the
intelligence community prior to those crises that are foreseen. Of course,
there are crises that strike out of the blue and in which one simply has to
do the best he can.. On the other hand the Indo-Pak and the Cease-fire
crises were foreseen enough in advance for serious contingency planning
to take place. There has been some discussion at the NSC staff that per-
haps the WSAG mechanism ought to have a sub-committee under the
direction of Dick Kennedy which would undertake to specify in advance
as best they can the kinds of issues they believe will arise, the kinds of
questions that the policy makers are almost bound to ask, etc. This
would allow some planning by the community to not only improve collection,
but to perhaps even do some stockpiling of analysis, etc. The Cease-fire
crisis probably would not have been handled by this mechanism, since
the State Department had primary responsibility and it was not handled via
the WSAG mechanisms. In any case this is an area that deserves further
consideration by the DCI. Sam Hoskinson is interested in this and
pursuing a program of contingency planning for another Egyptian-Israeli
crisis now pending.

3. A characteristic of some crises, for example the Indo-Pak, is that
they have two stages. In the Indo-Pak case there was a long period
running from approximately March 1971 through perhaps October or
mid November when the crisis was gradually building up. People foresaw

significant problems emerging and the main decision problem for the government was what policy should we have, what contingency planning should we do, how can we most efficiently shut off various aid programs, etc. The second stage was a full-blown crisis, with actual military conflict during the latter part of November and the early part of December. What is noticeable with respect to the intelligence support, given these two distinct periods, is that there was very little transition or shift in the kind of product being supplied. Except, of course, that in the heat of the crisis, the second period, there was an intense effort to keep up with events, with situation reporting several times a day. After a certain point U.S. policy was set, the kind of information, or argumentation, that had been fruitful up until that point no longer was as useful. But the community, or many parts of the community, which did not agree with the policy continued to slant its products, to slip in argumentation against the policy. This may or may not annoy the top level leadership, but in any case it is not helpful. One is, at that point, largely beyond the stage of discussing what the policy is to be; the problem is, primarily, how best to implement it. It seems to me that at that point the intelligence community ought largely to switch to an attempt to supply the top level people with tactically useful intelligence. For example, if the policy is to put pressure on the Indian government to see things our way, to desist from what it is doing; what would be useful is information about how to twist their arm, the most effective ways of influencing their behavior, etc. What does intelligence know that they can add to the stockpile of ideas that may be tactically useful in this situation?

There may well be similar situations in the future. It appears to me that an understanding that there may be two stages in crises, and that the kind of assistance needed by the top level people may be different in the two stages would be useful to the community in preparing itself to act and to service top level leaders more effectively.

In addition to these items there were two very important new insights, at least for me, that developed in the course of supervising the studies. The insights derived not so much from study results themselves, but from the persistent inability and incapacity of the study teams to deal with several problem areas that I had wanted them to focus on. A principal area I had wanted two of the study teams to focus upon was the role that intelligence had played in the use of military forces for political purposes during two of the crises. In the Indo-Pak crisis the

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deployment of the Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal and in the Jordanian Civil War the use of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and some other posturing of U.S. forces were used to signal to the major participants U.S. concern and intent. In any case the most important insights that I obtained that require some further thought and action are:

1. With respect to the role of military forces in crises, that is their use for political purposes, the study team systematically failed to produce anything useful. The reasons were twofold. First, the intelligence community is for most purposes not involved in these parts of the crises. These moves were decided upon at the very highest level, and with only limited discussion in the WSAG. The orders went directly to the field commanders via the Joint Chiefs of Staff (who themselves do very little except pass on the orders with any information about constraints that had been decided upon). The design of the force movements and stance is done out in the field command. This means that the intelligence community plays essentially no role in the design of these moves. I believe that it might have something useful to contribute, especially since the objective is to influence the perceptions and the decisions of the other major governments involved in the crisis.* The intelligence community also takes very little part in the execution of these crisis moves, even though I have the impression that the clandestine services, for example,

Finally, the intelligence community has more problems than it ought to in trying to monitor the results obtained because of its lack of understanding as to what U.S. forces are doing. Its ability to analyze the reactions of the other side are compromised; it doesn't know precisely what to focus on and how to interpret what it sees.

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If all these obstacles were not enough, it is clear to me, (and part of a deeper problem I wish to discuss separately) that many, if not most people in the intelligence community (particularly those in State and the CIA) do not share the world view of top leaders or the military. The President and Henry Kissinger feel that the moves they make with our forces are some of the most important, high leverage actions that

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*Indeed, I believe the intelligence community should play a bigger role in (1) the design of the moves, (2) enhancing the effectiveness of the military moves and (3) in providing feedback through monitoring the effects of the moves. Dick Kennedy and I want to discuss a proposal for how to do this with the DCI.

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they have at their disposal in times of political-military crisis. This perception about how the world is put together, what is effective in influencing the judgments and behavior of other nations involved in the crises, is not shared by the many people in the intelligence community. The reasons may be partly ideological, or their model of what the world is, or ought to be, is different than that of the top decisionmakers. It may be that they have never had a view of the world as it appears to the top levels of the government, and thus simply cannot imagine the nature of the competitive political - military game in which our leaders are engaged. Whatever the reasons, there is, I believe, a considerable difference in the perception of the world, how its put together, how it runs, that separates the top levels from the people trying to serve them. The divergence may be especially sharp with regard to the political use of military power. Its almost as though in a chess game the players believe that queens and rooks are the most important and powerful pieces on the board, while the people advising them and watching the game believe that the knights and the pawns are more important. This difference in perception, or fundamental assumptions, may be one of the most important barriers to the intelligence community adequately supporting the top level decisionmakers.

2. This problem of the lack of shared perceptions is, I believe, a very general problem of which the above instance is only a single example. I believe that the most interesting new insight that I derived from doing the studies is precisely this. I cannot prove it, but it is a very credible hypothesis, and there is not space enough here to fully characterize the many aspects of the perception problem.* I believe that the intelligence people find themselves trying to assist top level leaders, whose view of the world they do not share, whose knowledge of the kind of game that is being played they do not have. Thus, there is not only a communication problem in that the top level people do not communicate their needs well enough and frequently enough; but there is also a perception problem. Even when the top level people tell the intelligence community what they want, the intelligence community analysts may not understand them.

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*The general nature of the differences in top level and community analysts' views are in the perceptions of the context within which the crisis is viewed. The analyst's view is narrowly focused on the immediate arena of the crisis; the top level sees it as part of a wider game involving the Soviets and Chinese. The time horizons differ. The range of concerns are broader on top.

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There is no easy way to solve this kind of a problem. Some of the kinds of recommendations that are in the Working Group report will help. Improved communication will improve the focus and quality of the product from the point of view of the top level consumers. The continued presence of people like _____ in the DCI's office, in non-crisis times as well as in crisis times, can gradually shift the perception of the intelligence producers and analysts. But my belief is that major change will not be easy. What needs to be tried are things that lie more in the area of training of analysts, and the rotation of more analysts through the NSC staff where they can more directly come to understand the nature of the top level perspectives. Through such measures the analysts can come to at least appreciate, or to share, top level perceptions of the nature of the problems they face and the nature of the world and of the international political-military game.

In particular I believe that it would be useful to have a course for training analysts using a case study method based upon very detailed studies of past crises. It should be possible to do appropriate case studies after particular crises have cooled politically. The three case studies that have been undertaken by the NSCIC Working Group are a start, but are far from detailed enough and incomplete on key problem areas as I have mentioned. Indeed it is specifically because these case studies failed to come to grips with some of these problems that I perceived the severity of this intelligence community perception problem. I believe that an appropriate course could be put together over the course of the next several years and it might play a significant role in sensitizing intelligence analysts and managers to top level perspectives.